The Ostend Manifesto
- Mark Shubert
- Aug 20
- 10 min read
Aix-la-Chapelle,
October 15, 1854
Sir:
The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the
President in the several confidential dispatches you have addressed to
us, respectively, to that effect, have met in conference, first at Ostend, in
Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instants, and then at Aix-la-
Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.
There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and
sentiments between us, which we are most happy to inform you has
resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important
subjects submitted to our consideration.
We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced, that
an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the government of
the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it
can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of $ (this item was left blank).
The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be
presented though the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme
Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in
which the people both of Spain and the United States are so deeply
interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They
should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the
world.
We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has
arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the
sale, as those of the United States in the purchase of the island, and that
the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.
Under these circumstances we cannot anticipate a failure, unless
possibly through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no
right whatever to interfere in the matter.
We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this
conclusion, and, for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under
two distinct heads:-
1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little
delay as possible.
2. The probability is great that the government and Cortes of Spain will
prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the
highest and best interests of the Spanish people.
Then 1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the
peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant
on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its
present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of
states of which the Union is the providential nursery.
From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the
immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to
the ocean.
On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of
some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves though this
river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the
last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time
Louisiana was annexed to it.
The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population,
the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and Pacific
states, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is
a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it had proved to be
a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.
Indeed the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security,
as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.
Its immediate acquisition by our government is of paramount
importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation
devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.
The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and encourages
between them and the citizens of the United States has, in the progress
of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they
now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one
destiny.
Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of the island
exceedingly dangerous to the United States.
The system of immigration and labor, lately organized within its limits,
and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers,
threaten an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful
consequences to the American people.
Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent
cause of anxiety and alarm.
But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended
that foreign powers, in violation of international law, would interpose
their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the island. Its
inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible
governments-that of absolute despotism delegated by a distant power to
irresponsible agents, who are changed at short intervals, and who are
tempted to improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate
fortunes by the basest means.
As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the
suppression of the African slave-trade in the island. This is rendered
impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible
temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious
officials, who, to attain their ends, scruple not to trample the most
sacred principles under foot.
The Spanish government, at home, may be well disposed, but experience
has proved that it cannot control these remote depositaries of its power.
Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and
appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from
a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and
Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of
England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an
important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the
increasing population and prosperity of the island.
2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be
benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly
and essentially promoted.
She cannot but see what such a sum of money s we are willing to pay for
the island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.
Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of
railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the
Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their
prosperity would date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.
France has already constructed continuous lines of railway from Havre,
Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasbourg via Paris, to the Spanish
frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a
condition to extend these roads through her northern provinces to
Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.
This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of
attraction for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and
profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the
stimulus given to industry by remunerative prices, would teem with
cereal grain, and her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased
quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become what a bountiful
Providence intended she should be-one of the first nations of
continental Europe-rich, powerful, and contended.
Whilst two-thirds of the price of the island would be ample for the
completion of her most important public improvements, she might, with
the remaining forty millions, satisfy the demands pressing so heavily
upon her credit, and create a sinking-fund which would gradually relieve
her from the overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.
Such is her present wretched financial condition that her best bonds are
sold upon her own Bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst
another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value,
and are quoted at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were
issued. Besides, these are held principally by British creditors, who may,
from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their government
for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have
already been thrown out form high quarters, and unless some new
source of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is
not improbable that they may be realized.
Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her
resources, and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never
again return.
Cuba, in its palmist days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting
the expenses of its government, a clear annual income of more than a
million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a
degree as to leave a deficit chargeable on the treasury of Spain to the
amount of six hundred thousand dollars.
In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the island is an encumbrance,
instead of a source of profit to the mother country.
Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one
percent on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay
for its acquisition. But Spain is in danger of losing Cuba without
remuneration.
Extreme oppression, it s now admitted, justifies any people in
endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The
sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local
administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba, cannot
fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution
against Spain which has, of late years, been so often manifested. In this
condition of affairs it is in vain to expect that the sympathies of the
people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their
oppressed neighbors.
We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to
execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise n
revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could
prevent the citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of
other countries from rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is
an age of adventure, in which restless and daring spirits abound in every
portion of the world.
It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by
a successful revolution; and, in that event, she will lose both the island
and the price we are willing now to pay for it-a price far beyond what
was ever paid by one people to another for any province.
It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by
the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the
dangerous complications between nations, to which it may otherwise
give birth.
It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection
against the Spanish government, and should other independent nations
come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our
opinion, prevent the people and the government of the United States
from taking part in such a civil war, in support of their neighbors and
friends.
But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by
stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to
the United States, then the question will arise: What ought to be the
course of the American government under such circumstances?
Self-preservation is the law of states as well as with individuals. All
nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it
has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the
partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the
principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.
The United States have never acquired a foot of territory excerpt by fair
purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary
application of the people of that independent state, who desired to blend
their destinies with our own.
Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule,
because, although we might have claimed them by right of conquest in a
just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both
parties a full and ample equivalent.
Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba
without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-
preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our conscious rectitude
and our own self-respect.
Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of
the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.
After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present
value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider
the question; does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger
our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?
Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law,
human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we
possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would
justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if
there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his
own home.
Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor regard
the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into
the question whether the present condition of the island would justify
such a measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be
unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against
our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a
second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and
suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to
endanger our actually to consume the fair fabric of our Union.
We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward
such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought
certainly to be prepared for the worst.
We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at
issue between the United States and Spain. A long series of injuries to
our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are
unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of
American citizens and on the flag of the United States was perpetrated
in the harbor of Havana under circumstances which, without immediate
redress, would have justified a resort to measures of war in vindication
of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish
government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates and
assumed the responsibility attaching to them.
Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which the
peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to
cherish with foreign nations are constantly exposed, than the
circumstances of that case. Situated as Spain and the Untied States are,
the latter have forborne to resort to extreme measures.
But this course cannot, with due regard to their own dignity as an
independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now
submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the
United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those
suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences, and
of the securing the two countries against future collisions.
We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which
followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.
Yours very respectfully,
James Buchanan
J. Y. Mason
Pierre Soulé
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